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Abstract—Much effort has been taken to make WiMAX a 
secure technology. Due to its broadcast nature, WiMAX is more 
susceptible to security threats than a wired network. In this 
paper, we give a general overview of the security architecture 
and possible attacks that a WiMAX network may face. For each 
type of attack the misbehaviour metrics that may vary under 
these attacks are listed. This work can be used to select an 
appropriate threshold for detecting attack and can be applied to 
future research on IDS. 
 
Index Terms—WiMAX, Misbehaviour metrics, Key exchange, 
Wireless security, IEEE 802.16. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE IEEE 802.16 STANDARD [1], also known as Worldwide 
Interoperability of Microwave Access (WiMAX), is a 
promising technology that has taken a growing importance as 
a way to provide high-speed broadband wireless access to the 
final user. The first amendment, IEEE 802.16-2001, was 
designed to operate within a frequency band of 10-66GHz, in 
a point-to-point or point-to-multipoint setting. After the 
802.16-2004 amendment, WiMAX also supports the 2-11GHz 
frequency band, and the use of OFDM and OFDMA. WiMAX 
supports both, Time Division Duplexing (TDD) and 
Frequency Division Duplexing (FDD). The amendment IEEE 
802.16e added functionalities of mobility, and advances in 
security and Quality of Service (QoS). The latest amendment, 
IEEE 802.16j-2009, added a framework for multi-hop relay, 
also known as mesh networking. 
Due to the broadcast nature of WiMAX transmissions, both 
the Subscriber Station (SS) and Base Station (BS) are 
inherently more susceptible to security threats than a wired 
network, such as interception, modification, impersonation or 
injection attacks. Much effort has been taken since the IEEE 
802.16-2001 standard was approved, to make WiMAX a 
secure technology. Indeed, WiMAX specifies a security 
sublayer specifically to address all the security issues. It has 
sought to avoid the same mistakes that were conducted by 
WiFi, in security. In the IEEE 802.11 standard, security was 
added to the standard after the first standard and successive 
amendments were approved, that made WiFi a technology 
with several vulnerabilities. Even though, and despite of all 
efforts taken in security, the IEEE 802.16 standard still has 
vulnerabilities. 
At present, several papers have been published to address 
these vulnerabilities in WiMAX. So far, mainly these papers 
are focused on summarising the type of attacks that a WiMAX 
network may experience [2], shows standard improvements in 
order to obtain stronger security [3], or both, summarise type 
of attacks and improve the standard security [4]. Currently, in 
wireless networks, researches attempt to secure these wireless 
networks by performing Intrusion Detection (IDS). Much 
progress has been made in technologies such as WiFi, within 
which IDS is a widely studied topic [5]. Several publications 
present studies that develop IDS based on cross-layer 
techniques [6]. However, little progress has been made in 
developing IDS focused on the IEEE 802.16 standard. One of 
the few publications in this area is [7], which describes a 
system to enhance the network resistance to jamming attack, 
based on a link adaption algorithm. 
In this paper we give a general overview of the attacks that 
a WiMAX network may face, focusing on the MAC layer. 
According to each attack, the misbehaviour metrics that may 
vary under these attacks are highlighted. This study aims to 
facilitate the task of selecting an appropriate threshold able to 
reflect the behaviour of the communications, detect whether 
the network is under attack and apply to developing an IDS. 
This study is a subjective work. It has been done from what 
the IEEE 802.16 standard explains. No practical experiment 
has get been performed, but will form future work. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section II, a brief 
overview of the security architecture in the IEEE 802.16 
standard is given. In section III, the networks entry and key 
exchange protocols that the MAC layer performs are analysed. 
In section IV, possible attacks are presented and the 
misbehaviour metrics due to these attacks are listed. 
II. SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
The IEEE 802.16 standard supports two types of 
transmission duplexing, TDD and FDD. In both, transmissions 
are scheduled using DL-MAP and UL-MAP messages, which 
describe the timing and contents of the downlink and uplink 
respectively. In the TDD case, the uplink is Time Division 
Multiple Access (TDMA), the bandwidth is divided into time 
slots within which an individual SS is allowed to transmit. The 
downlink schedules when the BS transmits. In the FDD case, 
uplink and downlink transmissions occur simultaneously on 
different frequencies. 
In WiMAX, security is an important aspect to consider. The 
IEEE 802.16 standard provides a security sublayer in the 
MAC layer to support privacy issues across the wireless 
network, which provides security mechanisms for privacy and 
access control, such as authentication, authorisation, key 
exchange and encryption of data across the network. As 
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specified in [3], this security sublayer is based on two main 
components, an encapsulation protocol for providing packet 
data encryption, and a Privacy and Key Management (PKM) 
protocol for providing the secure distribution of the keying 
material and authorised access to connections between BS and 
SS. 
As explained in more detail by [8], the encapsulation 
protocol determines the encryption and authentication 
methods supported by each SS. It consists of the data 
encryption algorithm, the data authentication algorithm and 
the Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) encryption algorithm. The 
PKM protocol defines the set of rules responsible for 
authentication and authorisation of the SS, periodic 
reauthorisation, reception and renewal of key material. As 
defined in [3], the PKM protocol can be divided in two main 
parts, authorisation and Authentication Key (AK) exchange, 
and the key management protocol, during which the TEK is 
exchanged. There are two versions of PKM protocols 
supported by the IEEE 802.16 standard. The protocol 
supported since the first IEEE 802.16 standard, PKMv1, 
which only provides SS authentication, and the protocol 
incorporated by the IEEE 802.16e standard, PKMv2, which 
provides mutual authentication and supports mobile SS. 
The IEEE 802.16 standard introduces the idea of a Security 
Association (SA), a set of security parameters of the 
connection, such as selected encryption algorithms and keying 
method, that BS and SS share with each other, in order to 
establish secure communications. There are two types of SA, 
authorisation SA, responsible for protect the authentication of 
the SS, and data SA, responsible for protect the transport 
connections. More details of its structure are described by [8]. 
III. PHASES 
A. etwork entry procedure 
SS goes through multiple steps to join a WiMAX network. 
The procedure aims to establish a communication between SS 
and BS, and negotiate the proper parameters utilised on this 
communication. Initially, the SS attempts to get 
synchronisation with the most suitable downlink frequency. 
Through the DL-MAP and Downlink Channel Descriptor 
(DCD) messages, the SS obtains information about the 
downlink characteristics, such as the downlink channel ID, 
modulation type, forward error correction code type, usage 
time and the BS ID. Similarly, SS gets information about the 
uplink characteristics from UL-MAP and Uplink Channel 
Descriptor (UCD) messages, as the Connection Identifier 
(CID) and the details of the initial ranging interval. If any of 
the downlink and uplink channels are unsuitable, the SS 
restarts the process attempting to synchronise with the next 
most suitable downlink frequency. 
Since each SS has unique characteristics, it is critical to 
synchronise the channel parameters, such as transmission 
power level and timing, between SS and BS. The SS makes 
use of contention windows to randomly select one available 
ranging slot that the SS will utilise to perform the initial 
ranging. The BS uses a ranging response (RNG-RSP) message 
to inform the SS about the timing, transmission power level 
and frequency adjustments. Through the exchange of ranging 
request (RNG-REQ) message and RNG-RSP, the BS and SS 
negotiate these parameters. 
Once the SS has obtained a determinate slot within which 
communicate to the BS, it determines and negotiates with BS 
the security parameters both will use in the authorisation 
protocol. It is done by exchanging basic capabilities request 
(SBC-REQ) and basic capabilities response (SBC-RSP) 
messages. 
B. Authentication protocol 
To establish a shared key between both, the BS and SS 
perform the authentication protocol. This protocol is begun by 
the SS sending its Cert(SS.Manufacturer) to the BS, which is 
used to verify and decide if SS is a trusted device or not. This 
authentication protocol is described in more detail in [3]. 
Afterwards, SS sends an authorisation request (Auth-REQ) 
message, requesting for an authentication key (AK) to the BS. 
This message consists of the X.509 certificate of SS, which 
contains the Public Key (PK) and MAC address of the SS, its 
security capabilities, which are the authentication and data 
encryption algorithms supported by SS, and a SA 
identification (SAID). 
After having validated the SS identity, the BS generates an 
AK and sends it to the SS, via an authorisation replay (Auth-
REP) message. This message contains the AK, which is RSA 
encrypted by the PK of SS, a sequence number to differentiate 
between consecutive AK (SeqNo), AK lifetime and a 
SAIDList. Besides, if the SS identity is not validated, the BS 
replies with an invalid authentication (Auth-INVALID) 
message, rejecting the request of SS. 
This protocol differs in some aspects to the new 
authentication protocol, PKMv2, illustrated in Fig. 1. The AK 
is simultaneously derived by BS and SS. Instead of generating 
an AK by itself, the BS derives and sends to SS a pre-AK. 
Once exchanged, both SS and BS are able to generate the 
same AK from this pre-AK. Additionally, PKMv2 provides 
mutual authentication between BS and SS, adding the 
Cert(BS), X.509 certificate of BS, within the Auth-REP 
message, that is used by the SS to verify the identity of BS. 
Also, in other to avoid any message that could be replayed, 
some numbers-used-once (nonce) are added and an additional 
Auth-Acknowledgement message. 
Once the AK lifetime expires or is about to, the SS sends an 
Auth-REQ message to the BS, requesting new keying 
material. The BS generates a new AK or pre-AK, depending 
 
Fig. 1. PKMv2 Authentication protocol. 
on the protocol, and sends it to the SS within in an Auth-REP 
message [9]. During the time the current AKs remains active, 
both AK are active simultaneously. In case the AK expires 
before reauthentication, the BS will treat the SS as 
unauthorised. 
C. Key management protocol 
Once BS and SS share the AK, a key management protocol, 
exchanges a TEK between both two. The Key Encryption Key 
(KEK), which is derived from the AK, is used to encrypt the 
transfer of the TEK. BS always maintains two active sets of 
keying material per each SAID, to prevent data traffic 
corruption when the currently used TEK expires, OldTEK and 
NewTEK. Duration of these two TEKs overlaps. Before one 
TEK expires, the new TEK is activated and a new one is 
requested. 
The process, illustrated in Fig. 2, may be started by either, 
by the BS sending the Rekey message, if it determines 
rekeying is necessary, or by the SS with the Key-Request 
message. The Rekey message consists of SeqNo, a sequence 
number, sent to SS in the Auth-REQ message by BS, to 
differentiate between consecutive AKs, SAID which 
represents the rekeyed SA, and the HMAC(1), which is 
derived from the AK and allows the SS to authenticate the 
message and detect message forgery. 
The Key-Request message consists of a SAID, the 
HMAC(2), which allows to the BS to authenticate the message 
and detect message forgery, and SeqNo. In case HMAC(2) is 
not valid, BS rejects this request by sending a Key-Reject 
message to SS. Otherwise, BS replies with the Key-Reply 
message, which includes renew keying materials, OldTEK and 
NewTEK, HMAC(3), SeqNo and SAID. 
The aim of TEK exchange is to provide data traffic 
encryption. The employed encryption method varies between 
each standard. According to [10], the IEEE 802.16-2004 
standard only supports DES-CBC, while the IEEE 802.16e 
standard supports DES-CBC and AES in different modes, 
CBC, CTR, CCM, ECB and AES-Key-Wrap. 
IV. VULNERABILITIES AND MISBEHAVIOUR METRICS 
PHY Layer 
As with other wireless technologies, WiMAX is vulnerable 
to different types of Jamming attacks. Jamming, considered as 
a Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, is the act of injecting 
interference into the frequency channel being utilised by BS 
and SS, at a level high enough to disrupt the authorised 
wireless communication. 
These attacks can be summarised as brute force jamming, 
periodic jamming, precision jamming or message flooding. In 
brute force jamming, an attacker constantly injects a noise 
signal into the frequency channel used by the BS and SS. In 
periodic jamming, an attacker injects a noise signal, 
intermittently, for short intervals of time, either with a static or 
variable periodicity. In precision jamming, an attacker injects 
a noise signal, for short intervals, during the BS or specific SS 
transmissions, and only over determined messages. This type 
of attack requires the attacker to have knowledge of when 
messages of a specific source or destination are being sent. In 
Message flooding, an attacker constantly sends messages, in 
order to keep the destination of the messages busy processing 
or rejecting them. 
Jamming is an easy attack to mount and difficult to prevent. 
Indeed, there is no mechanism efficient enough to protect 
against jamming attack on wireless networks. Some of the 
defence mechanisms are based on link adaption, for instance, 
increasing the power of signal transmission or using spectrum 
spreading techniques as Frequency Hopping Spread (FHSS) 
and Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS). 
Under jamming attack, there would be expected to be: 
• A variance in the signal-to-noise rate. 
• An increased number of collisions in slots different to the 
ranging slots, which theoretically are collision free. 
• An increased number of switches of the frequency used 
for communication. 
MAC Layer 
1) etwork Entry Procedure 
An Eavesdropping attack is based on intercepting messages 
exchanged between BS and SS and obtaining sensible 
information. An attacker may create a detailed profile about 
the BS or SS, including capabilities or security information, 
and afterwards performs an active attack, such as DoS. 
Eavesdropping is a passive attack difficult to detect because it 
does not modify the intercepted data traffic. 
As said, the information exchanges between BS and SS 
before the authentication protocol and the MAC management 
messages are unencrypted. An attacker may easily obtain 
secret information from these messages. Reference [2] gives a 
summary of unencrypted messages exchanged during the 
network entry procedure and the information that an attacker 
may obtain from them. 
Some of the messages that an attacker may obtain secret 
information from are DL-MAP, DCD, UL-MAP, UCD, RNG-
REQ and RNG-RSP, which contain timing information. 
Therefore, an attacker can determine the specific moment 
when the BS or SS is going to transmit, and use it to facilitate 
a Jamming attack. 
The SS stays in synchronisation with the BS as long as it 
keeps receiving DL-MAP, UL-MAP, DCD and UCD 
messages at specified intervals of 600ms and 50s, respectively 
[2]. If an attacker disrupts one of these messages, it causes loss 
of synchronisation, and consequently, the SS will try to 
synchronise with the next more suitable downlink frequency. 
Under a jamming attack, there would be experienced: 
• A low number of DL-MAP, UL-MAP, DCD or UCD 
 
Fig. 2. Key management protocol. 
messages received by the SS. 
• A high number of RNG-REQ messages, with different 
CID, sent by an individual SS. 
• A difference between the number of sent SBC-REQ 
messages and the number of received SBC-RSP 
messages. 
As happens with the messages explained above, if an 
attacker disrupts the RNG-REQ, RNG-RSP, SBC-REQ or 
SBC-RSP messages within a given period of time, the SS will 
restart the full process. 
During initial ranging, the SS makes use of contention 
windows to select an available ranging slot. Once a slot is 
selected, the SS transmits and waits for a RNG-RSP message. 
If the response message is not received within 50ms and 
200ms, it assumes that a collision has happened and will select 
a ranging slot within a larger backoff time period before 
retransmitting again, using this time a higher transmission 
power level [2]. If an attacker disrupts the retransmission for a 
maximum of 16 times, the SS will restart and try to 
synchronise using another downlink frequency. 
This would lead to: 
• An increase in the number of collisions within the 
ranging process. 
• An appreciable increase of the delay to accomplish the 
ranging process. 
• An increase in the value of the backoff period for an 
individual SS. 
• The number of times that a RNG-REQ message is sent 
by an individual SS, using the same CID, would reach 
16. 
• A difference between the number of sent RNG-REQ 
messages and the number of received RNG-RSP 
messages. 
The RNG-RSP message, transmitted by BS in response to a 
RNG-REQ message, contains timing information, 
transmission power level and frequency adjustments that the 
SS uses to set its parameters. Also, the BS is allowed to send a 
RNG-RSP message in order to readjust in the transmission 
parameters. 
Due to the fact that this message is unencrypted and 
unauthenticated, it makes the process vulnerable to a Forgery 
attack. An attacker may intercept the RNG-RSP message, 
modify it with false timing, power level or frequency 
information, and send this fake message to the SS. If the 
transmission power level is not high enough, the signal may 
not reach the BS. In addition, if the transmission power level 
is very high, it may consume excessive energy resources from 
the SS. If the SS sets a different frequency than the BS 
expects, both parts will never establish a communication with 
each other. Furthermore, if the uplink timing information is 
altered, the SS might cause collisions with the communication 
of other SSs, due to the fact that the SS under attack will 
transmit within the time slots reserved for these SS. In any 
case, the QoS will be degraded. 
Under forgery attack, there would be: 
• A difference between the number of sent RNG-REQ 
messages and the number of received RNG-RSP 
messages. 
• A drop in the number of messages received by the SS, 
after have been received a RNG-RSP message. 
• A high number of unanswered SBC-REQ messages by a 
SS, after having received a RNG-RSP message. 
• A high number of RNG-REQ messages, with different 
CID, sent by an individual SS. 
• Loss of synchronisation between BS and SS, if both are 
already synchronised to each other. 
• An increased number of collisions in slots different from 
the ranging slots, which theoretically are collision free. 
• An increase in the number of slots unutilised. 
Reference [2] claims that the RNG-RSP message can be 
used to cause the SS to abandon the currently used downlink 
channel and try to synchronise with other downlink 
frequencies. In the same way as before, an attacker can 
intercept the RNG-RSP message, modify it and make the SS 
restart the process. 
This would cause: 
• Loss of synchronisation between BS and SS, if both are 
already synchronised to each other. 
• An increase in the number of sent RNG-REQ messages, 
with different CID, following the reception of RNG-RSP 
messages. 
• A high number of RNG-RSP messages with the ranging 
status field set to the value 2. 
As presented in [11], an attacker can modify the security 
capabilities in the SBC-RSP message and modify the security 
capabilities used in the communication. For instance, selecting 
the weakest encryption method or establishing no security. 
To accomplish all these types of forgery attacks, the 
attacker must transmit at the same time that the legitimate BS 
does. This has to be done with a higher transmission power 
level than the BS, in order to make the SS think that the signal 
from the BS is background noise. 
2) Authentication Protocol on PKMv1 
The effect of a Jamming attack would be similar in PKMv1 
and PKMv2. SS sends an Auth-REQ message requesting for 
an AK. The BS generates and sends back, an Auth-REP 
message, to the SS. If an attacker causes a collision with the 
Auth-REP message, the SS will not receive the keying 
material within a given period. Hence, the authentication fails 
and the SS start from the network entry procedure. A jamming 
attack is also applicable to the reauthentication process. 
Under a jamming attack, there would be: 
• A high number of RNG-REQ messages, with different 
CID, sent by an individual SS. 
• An increase in the number of Auth-REP messages 
immediately followed by a RNG-REQ message, with 
different CID, sent by the destination SS of the Auth-
REP messages. 
• A difference between the number of sent Auth-REQ 
messages and the number of received Auth-REP 
messages. 
• A high number of unanswered Auth-REQ messages by a 
SS. 
• An increase in the number of AKs exchanged 
unaccomplished because of time expiration. 
On the other hand, [3] explains that, after receiving an 
Auth-REQ message, the BS may define a time period within 
which it rejects any Auth-REQ messages containing the same 
Cert(SS). By replaying multiple times an Auth-REQ message, 
the attacker makes the BS consume resources rejecting these 
replayed messages. This would cause: 
• A high number of Auth-INVALID messages to be sent to 
the same SS. 
• A high number of Auth-INVALID messages received, 
without any Auth-REQ messages having been sent. 
• A difference between the number of sent Auth-REQ 
messages and the number of received Auth-INVALID 
messages. 
• A high number of Auth-REQ messages received by the 
BS, containing the same Cert(SS), in a short time period. 
Slightly different than the attack explained above, if an 
attacker intercepts an Auth-REQ message and replays it to the 
BS, it will make the BS suffer a Replay attack. Once it 
receives the Auth-REQ message, the BS will perform a 
reauthentication of the SS, by generating and sending to SS 
new keying material. 
Under replay attack, there would be: 
• A large difference between the number of sent Auth-
REQ messages and the number of Cert(SS.Manufacturer) 
received by a SS. 
• A high number of Auth-REP messages received by the 
SS, without have been sent any Auth-REQ message. 
As presented in [2], the BS may send the Auth-INVALID 
message, unauthenticated, without having received an Auth-
REQ message. If an attacker makes use of this property, 
intercepts and replays an Auth-INVALID message, the SS 
restarts the full process from the network entry procedure. 
This would cause: 
• A high number of Auth-INVALID messages sent to the 
same SS. 
• A high number of Auth-INVALID messages received, 
without have been sent any Auth-REQ message. 
• A high number of RNG-REQ messages, with different 
CID, sent by an individual SS. 
• A difference between the number of Auth-INVALID and 
Auth-REP messages sent by the same BS. 
• A difference between the number of sent Auth-REQ 
messages and the number of received Auth-RSP 
messages. 
Attackers can benefit from the lack of mutual authentication 
between the BS and SS, to perform a Forgery attack. After 
intercepting an Auth-REQ message, the attacker can create its 
own AK and send it back to the SS. Due to the fact the SS 
cannot differentiate between the attacker and the legitimate 
BS, if the SS accepts the fraudulent AK, the attacker will take 
control over the communication of the SS [8]. Under a forgery 
attack, there would be: 
• An increase in the number of received Auth-REP 
messages, by a SS, immediately followed by a second 
Auth-REP message, containing different keying material. 
• A difference between the number of sent Auth-REQ 
messages and the number of received Auth-REP 
messages. 
• A high number of Key-Reject messages sent by a BS. 
• A difference between the number of sent Key-Request 
messages and the number of received Key-Reply 
messages. 
3) Key Management Protocol 
After sending the key-request message, the SS expects to 
receive a response from the BS within the next 3 seconds to 
successfully accomplish the TEK exchange. Otherwise, the SS 
resends the Key-Request message until it gets response or 
reaches a given number of retransmissions. If an attacker 
performs a Jamming attack on the Key-Request message, the 
SS will not receive the keying material. Hence, the process 
fails and the SS has to restart the network entry procedure. 
Under a jamming attack, there would be: 
• An increase in the number of Key-Request messages sent 
by an individual SS. 
• The number of times that a Key-Request message is sent 
by an individual SS would reach the maximum number 
of retransmissions. 
• A high number of unanswered Key-Request messages by 
a SS. 
• A difference between the number of sent Key-Request 
messages and the number of received Key-Response 
messages. 
As show in [3], the key management protocol is vulnerable 
to a Replay attack. SS cannot detect if a Rekey message is 
legitimate or replayed by an attacker. Whether an attacker 
intercepts and resends a Rekey message to the SS, it will cause 
a restart of the key management protocol. Similarly, the BS 
cannot detect if an attacker has intercepted and replayed a 
Key-Request message from a legitimate SS. In that case, the 
BS will reply a Key-Request message with new keying 
material, the OldTEK and NewTEK. 
Under a replay attack, there would be: 
• An increase in the number of Rekey messages sent to an 
individual SS, without TEK lifetime has expired. 
• An increase in the number of Key-Request messages sent 
from an individual SS, without TEK lifetime has expired. 
• An increase in the number of Key-Request and Key-
Reply messages exchanged. 
etwork Layer 
Once the keying material is exchanged, a secure data 
transmission can occur, by encrypting the data. The Network 
layer, through the use of the Internet Protocol (IP), allows the 
sending of datagrams, taking routing, addressing or 
segmentation decisions, from a source to a destination. 
However, IP lacks a mechanism to report errors or to inform if 
a datagram has been discarded. Because of that, the Internet 
Control Message Protocol (ICMP) was added to the Network 
layer, to allow routers of a network to report errors or to 
inform about unexpected channel anomaly. 
One type of ICMP message is the destination unreachable 
message. If a router cannot deliver a datagram, because of any 
channel anomaly, the router will inform the source that the 
datagram has been discarded. This is done through the use of 
an ICMP destination unreachable message. Other type of 
ICMP message is the source quench message. IP lacks a flow 
control mechanism, so the source of the packet never knows if 
the destination or an intermediate router suffers overflow. This 
type of ICMP message is sent to the source of the datagram 
when it has been discarded due to congestion. 
The Network layer is directly affected by the Jamming 
attack which occurs over the PHY and MAC layers. If an 
attacker launches a jamming attack over the data transmission 
and the communication is completely disrupted, this will not 
allow the datagram to be delivered. Hence, as explained, 
destination unreachable ICMP messages will be sent by the 
network layer. On the other hand, if the attacker launches the 
attack and causes packet loss and long delay, it will be 
interpreted by the network layer as congestion. As happens 
with destination unreachable ICMP messages, source quench 
ICMP messages will be sent by the network layer. 
Under jamming attacks, there would be: 
• An increase in the number of destination unreachable 
ICMP messages sent. 
• An increase in the number of source quench ICMP 
messages sent, with code field set to the value 0. 
• An increase in the number of source quench ICMP 
messages sent, with code field set to the value 1. 
If an attacker successfully impersonates a source of 
datagrams, it may perform a Forgery attack, and send 
datagrams using this fraudulent identity. From the point of 
view of the destination, a datagram sent either from the 
legitimate source or from the attacker seems to be sent from 
the same source. Assuming that, on average, the datagrams 
sent from and to the same source and destination tend to use 
similar routes, the value of Time To Live (TTL) field remains 
constant. This property may be utilized to detect forgery 
attack, if the legitimate source and the attacker are situated 
multiple hops apart by checking the TTL value. 
Under a forgery attack, there would be: 
• A difference between the values of the TTL of 
consecutive IP datagrams sent from the same source. 
Transport Layer 
Only Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is considered 
here as the transport protocol. The Transport layer, through the 
use of TCP, provides ordered segment delivery, without 
duplications or data loss. 
Because the segments sent by the transport layer are 
encapsulated into the data portion of datagrams, the Transport 
layer is directly affected by a Jamming attack as happens with 
the Network layer. According to TCP protocol behaviour, a 
source of segments will retransmit them until the source 
receives an ACK segment or until the maximum number of 
segment retransmissions is reached. If an attacker launches a 
jamming attack and disrupts the segment, the source of the 
segment will never receive the ACK segment. At this moment, 
the transport layer will send a Connection Reset (RST) 
segment in order to close the connection. 
Under a jamming attack, there would be: 
• A high number of segments sent, with the same sequence 
number, from the same source. 
• A difference between the numbers of segments sent and 
the number of ACK segments received. 
• An increase in the number of RST segments sent. 
• An increase in the value of the backoff period for an 
individual source. 
• An average increase in the Round Trip Time (RTT) 
value for the same couple source-destination. 
• A difference between the number of received SYN 
segments and the number of received FIN segments. 
• An increase in the number of SYN segment 
retransmissions from the same source. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Despite all efforts taken with security, WiMAX still 
presents vulnerabilities. More research focused on this area is 
needed. In this paper, we have conducted an analysis of the 
threats that a WiMAX network may face and highlighted the 
estimated misbehaviour metrics that may vary on the network 
performance, according to these attacks. Our main objective is 
to develop an intrusion tolerance system, focused on WiMAX. 
With this work we have established the first step in our 
objective, which is to identify the possible attacks and 
determine the appropriate threshold for detecting such attacks. 
Ongoing work focuses on the study of the metrics in a real 
scenario. 
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